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Regulatory updates: Maine Public Utilities Commission  
Ralph E. Townsend 
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) Chair Thomas Welch has shown an extraordinary ability to 
re-shape Maine's regulatory landscape. He has shown understanding of both the legal and the 
public policy dimensions of the regulatory process. As a result, the process of regulation in 
Maine has become much more expeditious. I think that most participants would also say that the 
process has become more civil and less confrontational. On the substantive policy side, Welch 
has guided Maine away from traditional rate-base regulation towards a system with more 
market-oriented flexibility.  
It is quite possible that all four major Maine utilities will be subject to price cap regulation (or 
some close variant thereof) by the end of this year. Under price cap regulation, utility prices are 
tied to some kind of formula that allows automatic rate adjustments. Typically, such a formula 
allows rates to increase at the rate of inflation less an offset for productivity. Price caps are 
usually set for a predetermined number of years, with no rate cases filed by either side during the 
period of the cap. Central Maine Power (CMP) has previously agreed to a stipulation that 
implemented a five year "alternate rate plan" (ARP) that was essentially price cap regulation. 
The Commission has orally outlined a price cap regulation plan for NYNEX. The price cap 
docket for Bangor Hydro Electric Company is scheduled to be resolved in early summer. Maine 
Public Service is due to submit a proposal for alternative regulation.  
Maine's statutes specifically authorize alternative regulation, so the PUC can order 
implementation of price cap regulation even without agreement by the utility. This differs from 
most other states, where price caps have usually been the result of regulatory negotiation. In 
some states, utilities have an explicit choice between rate-base regulation and price cap 
regulation. In Vermont, for example, NYNEX declined a recent price cap plan. It is possible that 
one or more of the three utilities with pending price cap decisions will challenge Maine's statutes 
in court. Such a challenge would probably argue that a price cap formula did not provide an 
opportunity to earn just and reasonable returns on utility investments. The effect of such a legal 
challenge might be an extended period of regulatory uncertainty. Any such legal confrontations 
might also color the tenor of other regulatory proceedings.  
Electric markets in Maine, as in the rest of the country, are undergoing wrenching changes. In 
part because of the changes in regulation of CMP and Bangor Hydro, these wrenching changes 
are not flooding the PUC with new dockets.  
For example, the Maine Yankee shut-down (due to cracks in steam generator tubes) is likely to 
have much greater implications for stockholders than for ratepayers in Maine. The fuel clause 
(which had allowed automatic recovery of all fuel and electricity purchases) has been eliminated 
for both Central Maine Power and Bangor Hydro. Neither will be able to pass on automatically 
the costs of purchasing replacement power during the shut-down. Although CMP has a "relief 
valve" provision in its price cap plan, the company has indicated that it does not expect at this 
point to use that relief valve in this instance. Bangor Hydro is in the midst of a docket that could 
move it to a price cap plan somewhat similar to CMP's. Whether the Maine Yankee costs might 
affect the decision to move to price cap regulation or alter the starting point of a price cap for 
Bangor Hydro is less clear. Only Maine Public Service still has a fuel clause, so its ratepayers 
may feel the direct consequences of the Maine Yankee shut-down. It has delayed submission of a 
proposal for alternative regulation that was expected in April. If the CMP and Bangor Hydro 
cases are a proper precedent, Maine Public Service could face loss of the fuel clause in such a 
proceeding. The delay in filing might suggest that Maine Public has reservations about 
fundamental changes in the regulatory structure at this time.  
Maine utilities continue to work to get out of expensive electric supply contracts. Bangor Hydro 
now has regulatory authority to buy out the contracts for the Ultrapower wood chip plants in 
West Enfield and Jonesboro. Bangor Hydro has received legislative approval for the Finance 
Authority of Maine (FAME) to assist in financing a large share of that cost. The fuel costs for 
wood chip plants are non-competitive in the present environment of low wholesale prices for 
electricity. Co-generation plants at paper mills and waste wood plants seem less vulnerable. The 
process of buying out expensive energy supply contracts is pretty well along in Maine, but some 
additional purchases are quite possible.  
An important detail of the transition to more market-oriented regulation, the role of integrated 
resource planning (IRP) and demand-side management (DSM), has yet to be addressed directly 
in Maine. There is wide agreement that competition in wholesale generation will require some 
changes in IRP and DSM requirements. No agreement exists on the direction of that change. 
Utilities nation-wide have argued for some time that competition in supply will turn IRP into a 
market function. Moreover, utilities argue that DSM requirements place them at a competitive 
disadvantage, because they must provide subsidies to some customers that other competitors do 
not provide. Environmentalists, on the other hand, tend to argue that IRP and DSM regulations 
need to be extended to new competitors so that an environmentally sound "level playing field" is 
created. Some parties in Maine may be prepared to open this issue for reconsideration. One 
possible forum for that debate is Central Maine Power's pending filing on DSM planning for 
1996, which is required under its alternate rate plan. But because that filing must be acted upon 
in a relatively short time frame (prior to the end of 1995), another scenario might be a separate 
investigation on the broader issues.  
The Maine PUC was let off the hook on "stranded investment" when the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently announced that it would assume a broad role on that 
issue. Stranded investment is the term for the losses that utilities will suffer in the shift from 
regulated markets to competitive markets. These include both physical assets (like generating 
plants) and regulatory assets (like power contracts with independent power producers) that 
utilities will not be able to recover under competitive pricing. The broad assumption of 
responsibility by FERC was not generally expected, as it placed FERC in the middle of the most 
complicated regulatory issue in electricity today. The decision by FERC ended Maine's 
investigation into the same issue, which could have been an extremely contentious and divisive 
issue. 
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